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The Improbable Militarist: Jimmy Carter, the Revolution in Military Affairs and
Limits of the American Two-Party System
Abstract
Jimmy Carter is known for championing peace and pro-democracy causes in his post-presidency and is
widely respected as a moral leader. Few Americans, however, are aware of the fact that in his last two
years, Carter presided over a huge increase of the military budget that amounted to the largest in history
to that point and promoted the adoption of fancy new military technologies which would be applied in
wars waged by his successors. This paper examines Carter’s foreign policy and his embrace of the socalled Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which aimed to reinvigorate American military power after
Vietnam through the embrace of the digital revolution, and development of new precision guided
weapons, stealth bombers and drone warfare capabilities. Neglected in many academic studies, the RMA,
with its emphasis on precision-guided strikes and “smart weapons,” built on long-standing technofanaticism in U.S. culture which prioritized technical solutions to major social problems, in this case the
prospect of American imperial decline after Vietnam. It in turn complemented Carter’s human rights
agenda in its aim of facilitating a more “activist foreign policy” by fostering the illusion that future wars
could be waged cleanly and with limited collateral damage.
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“Administrations come and go but the Pentagon remains at the head of the table.”
–I.F. Stone, investigative journalist.
In February 1991, the U.S. military, employing an arsenal of high-tech weapons that
included Chrysler M-1 “Abrams” tanks capable of firing depleted uranium going 45 miles per
hour, cruise missiles guided by internal computers programmed with precise target coordinates,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and stealth F-117 aircraft fighters which took advantage of
new technology reducing an aircraft’s radar cross-section and infra-red signature, crushed the
Iraqi army following its occupation of Kuwait. In the spirit of triumphalism that followed, Gen.
Barry McCaffrey perceptively commented that “the war didn’t take 100 hours to win, it took
fifteen years.”1
Following the end of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon had embarked on a crash-program
to revitalize its fighting forces and to incorporate new technologies fit for the information age to
ensure greater military efficiency while transitioning to an all-volunteer force. Proponents of the
so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), including prominent defense intellectuals like
Albert Wohlstetter and Andrew Marshall, the head of the Pentagon’s in-house think tank,
believed that new precision guided weapons and a reinvigoration of air power supremacy could
help the U.S. to maintain its global hegemony after Vietnam by decisively defeating its enemies
with reduced manpower expenditure and limited “collateral damage.” The secret war in Laos
remained a key model as a war waged predominantly by proxy and through the air, with few
American casualties and little political fall-out.2
The 1970s was a watershed in American political history as the country could have gone
in two directions. Building off the momentum of the 1960s social movements, Democratic
candidate George S. McGovern promoted a progressive economic vision and the scaling back of
defense spending and overseas military commitments in the wake of the Vietnam debacle. Never
again, he said in his convention speech, should American boys be sacrificed for a corrupt Asian
dictatorship. Like his political hero Henry Wallace, McGovern’s platform scared financial and
political elites who coordinated a vigorous counter-offensive, with conservative Democrats and
labor leaders backing Richard Nixon in the 1972 election.3 Neoconservative intellectuals
simultaneously initiated what one analyst called a “scorched earth” campaign designed to
“reverse the verdict” of the 1960s, championing the reassertion of American military power as a
moral counter-force to communism and mechanism for overcoming the economic crises of the
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1970s, including waning economic competitiveness, energy shortages and stagflation (inflation
and unemployment).4
Jimmy Carter’s presidency proved crucial to the recrudescence of American military
power after Vietnam. Dominated by members of the Trilateral Commission, an executive
advisory committee to trans-national finance which envisioned a tri-polar world order led by the
U.S., Germany and Japan, the Carter administration (1977-1981) abandoned campaign pledges
to cut defense spending by $7 billion, and initiated budgetary increases that in his last year
amounted to the largest in history during peacetime to that point.5 Money for research and
development and the purchase of new aircraft and army equipment nearly doubled and Pentagon
support for research in the universities increased by nearly 70 percent after a brief decline due to
Vietnam-related protests.6
Under the direction of Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Air Force Secretary during the
Vietnam War (1965-1969), former President of California Institute of Technology and Director
of the Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory at Berkeley, heavy investment was made in the
development of Laser-guided bombs (LGBs), space based satellite systems and fighter planes
equipped with complex avionic systems consisting of large radars to detect enemy planes and
computerized fire control. Funding for missiles increased $485 million or 63.5 percent, leading
to the development of the Patriot Air Defense Missile system which gained fame in the Persian
Gulf War, along with Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank and
“Tomahawk” cruise missiles built by General Dynamics. They were accurate within a 100-foot
range from 1,500 miles and possessed on-board computer guidance systems that allowed it to
duck around hills and make necessary course corrections while eluding enemy radar.7
In promoting these new weapon systems, some named after victims of genocide, Carter’s
presidency was crucial to the unfolding revolution in military affairs, which drew on longstanding cultural fantasies of a war waged by machines and reshaped American foreign policy in
the years thereafter.8 Neglected in many academic studies focused on the Carter era and human
rights9, the RMA, with its emphasis on precision-guided strikes and “smart weapons,” actually
4
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Material (hereafter Zbig), box 16, 1980 campaign, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter
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Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, 55, 1 (October 1976).
8
H. Bruce Franklin, War Stars: The Superweapon in the American Imagination (Amherst, MA: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2008).
9
Daniel Sargent for example in a top-down overview of U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s (A Superpower
Transformed. Oxford University Press, 2014) omits discussion of the RMA, Carter’s arms build-up and the covert

complemented Carter’s human rights agenda in its aim of facilitating a more “activist foreign
policy” by fostering the illusion that future wars could be waged cleanly and with limited
collateral damage.10 The RMA also went hand in hand with neoliberal ideology in its
displacement of human labor - in this case soldiers and pilots who might question the purpose of
their mission – by machines in an effort to sustain access to capitalist markets and American
global hegemony.11
Feeding off Ronald Reagan’s campaign rhetoric, conservative pundits have criticized
Carter’s “flaccid approach to security issues” which they suggest added “momentum to
America’s post-Vietnam strategic decline.”12 Academics like Dave Schmitz and Vanessa Walker
yearning for a liberal hero by contrast praise Carter’s human rights policy, which they
differentiate with Reagan’s restoration of an aggressive anticommunism.13 Replicating the
partisan divide in U.S. politics, these analyses are flawed in failing to consider the large-scale
commitment to remilitarization under Carter along with his expansion of the U.S. military base
network in the Middle East. Edward Keefer in a 2017 biography of Harold Brown published for
the Secretary of Defense Historical Office finds great continuity between the later years of
Carter’s administration and Reagan’s first term. He wrote that Carter “became a reluctant convert
to increased defense spending” and “brought into production new weapons including stealth
aircraft, precision bombs and modern digital technology,” which “prepared the foundation for
President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s military buildup and revolution
in defense.”14 Military analyst Thomas Ricks analogously praises the visionary quality of Brown
and his associate William J. Perry for embracing the digital revolution then emerging in Silicon
Valley and transforming “everything from how targets would be hit (with precision weapons) to
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how U.S. aircraft would avoid being hit (stealth technology) which meant making some U.S. jets
almost invisible to radar.”15
Ricks’ analysis, however, obscures the fact that heavy investment in fancy military
technology helped warp the U.S. political economy by devaluing investment in civilian
manufacturing and social programs while helping to facilitate the illusion that war in the digital
age could be carried out cleanly, with the adoption of surgical strikes that could reduce collateral
damage.16 Many of the weapons systems furthermore were geared for a conventional war against
a now-defunct superpower rather than nationalist guerrillas or asymmetrical terrorist threats, and
have hence proved ineffective in winning wars.17
Despite a professed commitment to advancing human rights, America’s thirty ninth
president can be seen to have squandered a golden opportunity to reorient U.S. foreign policy in
a more progressive direction after the scandals of Vietnam and Watergate. He helped reinvigorate American militarism as part of a “limited liability empire” in which common citizens
do not have to play a direct role, and to institutionalize a permanent warfare state most
insidiously by framing it in a humanitarian veneer.18 This was consistent with the liberal
internationalist tradition dating back to Woodrow Wilson, which always packaged U.S.
militarism as a force for humanity.19
-------------------------------------------------------------------Jimmy Carter is an improbable champion of militarism as his post-presidency has been
characterized by peace and pro-democracy activism and he expressed pride in being the first
president since Herbert Hoover not to have American ground forces die in combat.20 Carter’s
worldview derived from the progressive wing of the Christian evangelical movement, which
embraced a tolerant outlook on race, cared about the poor and oppressed and often opposed
war.21 Seizing on the spirit of antiwar and human rights activism bred by the 1960s social
movements, Carter had expressed desire to cut down on arms sales to foreign dictatorships, cut
the number of foreign military advisers to less than a thousand and cut the CIAs budget by a
third.22 However, Carter lacked the political conviction and courage to fight back against the
Thomas E. Ricks, “A Shout-out for Two Key Things Harold Brown Did as Defense Secretary Under Carter: A
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Penguin, 1999); Jimmy Carter, Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas
Press, 1995), 70; Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 242.
21
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University Press, 1981), 247, 248, 249, and 250; Michael Klare, “Carter’s Arms Policy,” NACLA,
15

pressure mounted by conservative lobby groups financed by military industry like the Committee
on the Present Danger (forerunner of the Project of the New American Century), which
promoted alarmist and as history proved grossly erroneous proclamations about Soviet military
capabilities and pushed hard for remilitarization.23 His foreign policy was ultimately shaped by
hawkish voices in Congress like Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Cold Warriors in his administration like
Harold Brown, who had presided over the most sustained bombing campaign in history (3.2
million tons of bombs over Indochina) as Secretary of the Air Force.24
Carter himself was always enthralled by military gadgetry having been trained by the
Navy under Hyman Rickover and he apparently loved to examine the blueprints of the military’s
latest spy satellites.25 As Governor of Georgia, Carter had supported Nixon’s bombing of North
Vietnam, and had urged people to flash their headlights in solidarity with Lt. William Calley
after the My Lai massacre.26 His close ties with Lockheed Martin, Georgia’s top employer
alongside Coca-Cola, was exemplified by his taking a three-week trip through Latin America
aboard a Lockheed plane.27
Carter had been groomed for power following his appointment to the Trilateral
Commission, which was set up by David Rockefeller, Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, with
the goal of reordering of the global system after Vietnam. Financed by Committee on the Present
Danger member David Packard, chairman of Hewlett-Packard and a former Deputy Defense
Secretary as well as other leading military contractors like Bechtel Co., the Trilateral
Commission promoted renewed American hegemony along with that of Germany and Japan, and
a world of interdependent trade beneficial to multinational corporations in response to Nixon’s
move towards protectionism.28
Carter’s chief domestic adviser called him the first “neoliberal president,” fiscally
moderate and socially progressive. Many of his economic policies, including deregulation of the
trucking, oil and banking industries, lifting oil price controls, free trade, support for right-to-
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25
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26
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Administration: Myth and Reality,” Australian Left Review, 1 (62), 1977, 62.
27
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work legislation and cutting the capital gains rate tax for business, helped to advance corporate
power.29
Carter’s closest adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was a Rockefeller protégé who made the
case for the Vietnam War on CBS television. He wrote Between Two Ages: America’s Role in
the Technetronic Revolution (1970) which considered the acceleration of production owing to
growing scientific and technical knowledge as crucial to consolidating a Tri-polar world order
led by the U.S. with other advanced nations “who were at the forefront of scientific and
technological innovation.”30 Considering the New Left movement as an “infantile disorder,”
Brzezinski was a key supporter of the RMA, which was designed to apply the benefits of the
electronics, computing and communications revolutions to ensure greater military efficiency and
prevent future Vietnam quagmires. His outlook fit with a long tradition of technological
optimism rooted in a society whose “most notable and character forming achievement for almost
three centuries has been to transform a wilderness into a building site,” as historian Michael
Adas put it, and where technological innovation and technical aptitude was considered a crucial
measure of superiority over nonwestern peoples.31
The Vietnam War had shattered the illusions of the “Greatest Generation” that
technology could engender a more utopian society and sparked a deep revulsion for the
misapplication of science during the Cold War. In the spirit of Norbert Weiner - the world’s
foremost mathematical analyst who in 1947 penned a letter in the Atlantic Monthly vowing not to
support “irresponsible militarists”- activists formed groups like “Computer People for Peace,”
“Engineers for Social Responsibility” and “Science for the People,” which pledged not to
participate in war research or weapons production.32 Historian Matthew Wisnioski notes that
“not since the machine breaking uprisings of the early 19th century had so many citizens
perceived technology as a force to be resisted.”33
The U.S. army concluded from its humiliating defeat in Vietnam, however, that it
“needed not less technology but more,” as historian Alex Roland noted. “It was not that smart

29

See Robert Sherrill, The Oil Follies of 1970-1980: How the Petroleum Industry Stole the Show (and much more
besides) (Garden, City: My: Doubleday, 1983); Thomas Frank, Listen Liberal! (New York: Harper, 2016); Noam
Chomsky, “The Carter Administration: Myth and Reality,” Australian Left Review, No. 62, 10; Burton I. Kaufman
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weapons were bad; rather they were not smart enough.”34 Leonard Sullivan, Deputy Director of
Defense Research and Engineering for Southeast Asia, believed that Robert S. McNamara’s
electronic battlefield - which ringed the Ho Chi Minh Trail with electronic sensors and land
mines that emitted signals via Lockheed radio relay aircraft, balloon antennas and radar stations
to B-52 pilots - had “opened up some very exciting horizons as to what we can do five or ten
years from now. When one realizes that we can detect anything that perspires, moves, carries
metal, makes a noise or is hotter or colder than its surroundings, one begins to see the
potential…Eventually we will be able to tell when anybody shoots, what he is shooting at… to
get a ‘year 2000’ vision of an electronic map with little lights that flash for different kinds of
activities.”35
The Pentagon went into high gear after Vietnam trying to fulfill Sullivan’s technocratic
fantasy in which greater military efficiency was to be combined with a reduction in manpower
expenditure. Benefiting from the participation of legions of active-duty soldiers and veterans, the
Vietnam antiwar movement had helped to affix to the Vietnam War a high political cost and to
transform the post-World War II victory culture into one that was more pacifist oriented.36
Return to the isolationism of the 1930s was not an option, however, in an era of ever-expanding
corporate-oligopolistic power. Amidst an increasingly competitive global economy in which the
U.S. share of global GDP had fallen, multinational corporations invested $168 billion abroad in
1978 up from $52 billion in 1966 and 137 American banks held a total of 761 foreign branches
with combined assets of $3.5 billion.37 The United States also had amassed 865 overseas military
bases by this time, which could only be safeguarded through violence.38
The conundrum for policy makers was how to sustain a permanent warfare apparatus
amidst rising public skepticism. The solution sought out was a technological one – something
unsurprising in lieu of American history. From the time of Robert Fulton, who invented the
torpedo and submarine explosives during the American Revolution, American culture celebrated
scientific geniuses who spurred economic development and protected national security. The U.S.
was never directly impacted by the mechanized slaughter of modern war like Europeans and did
not experience the same epiphany regarding how science could be applied for destructive ends.39
Foreshadowing the RMA, Air Force founder “Hap” Arnold announced in August 1945 secret
experimentation with “Buck Rogers things,” such as missiles that could hit any target in the
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world.40 Rogers was a comic hero whose character developed rocket and liquid helium pistols
and other high-tech gadgets to defeat enemies like the Red Mongols in 2430 A.D.
The most influential science fiction writer of the Cold War, Robert Heinlein celebrated
the defeat of evil forces by super-weapons like a radioactive dust. In Starship Troopers (1959),
he featured a super-elite force, which uses a GPS equivalent, night vision goggles and personal
computers connected to satellite network to defeat the “Bugs,” who reflect a society built on selfsacrifice and cooperation ruled by Commissars. In the epic battle, the narrator puts on a powered
armor suit that enables him to jump over a house and come down to a feather landing and fire a
shoulder-mounted nuclear weapon after assessing his enemy while running at lightning speed.41
Heinlein’s writings had helped inspire the creation of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) by the Eisenhower administration in 1957 after the Soviet launching
of the Sputnik space satellite. It promoted advances in rocketry and ballistic missiles and
awarded contracts to scientists for development of fantasy weapons like radar death rays, and
magnetic missile shields in space as well as other Frankenstein creations such as attack drones
and killer-robots.42 The Carter administration near-doubled the budget of DARPA, which
reflected Albert Einstein’s warning after the use of the atomic bombs about the “horrendous
failure of Western civilization in its use of science and technology.”43
One of DARPA’s key innovations in the 1970s was the Laser-guided bomb (LGB),
which made use of advances in laser technology during the 1960s and were fitted with light
sensors that reflected laser radiation coming from a target whose coordinates were displayed by
computer.44 LGBs had been credited with destroying the seemingly indestructible 540 by 56 foot
Thanh Hoa Bridge and 8,500 foot Long Bien (Paul Doumer) Bridge along the Ho Chi Minh Trail
during Nixon’s Christmas bombing, although a Pentagon analysis of 200 combat drops
concluded that they got only about 30 or 40 percent hits on very large target areas, with the
misses tending to be by thousands of feet.45 The supposed success in Vietnam stimulated
intensified research by DARPA and companies like Lockheed Martin, Hughes aircraft, and
Texas Instruments, resulting in the development of the Paveway II light-sensing LGB, which
became operational during the 1986 bombing of Libya.46
40
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A 1976 RAND Corporation study said that LGBs provided the “morally attractive and
mutually beneficial possibility of disabling military targets without collateral damage,” thus
offering the political leadership a variety of military options to “fit the tone and interest of the
political discourse.”47 These comments fit with a tradition dating back to Billy Mitchell, Hap
Arnold’s mentor, in which lethal offensive weapons are conceived of as capable of limiting the
devastation of war; an illusion necessary to temper wide-scale antiwar sentiment that had
developed in response to Vietnam. Henry Rowen, chairman of the national intelligence council
and a former RAND Corporation president, testified before Congress in September 1975 that
“the increasing precision possible in the delivery of weapons…is making possible the
substitution of small weapons for large ones [which would] do a great deal to help set limits to
the scope and level of conflict. And the prospect of being able to take more effective action, with
less collateral damage, will enhance the deterrence of a significant range of action against our
interests.”48
In a 1974 essay, Albert Wohlstetter, the doyen of the defense intellectuals and a guru to
neoconservative policy makers such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, emphasized the need
for the U.S. to exploit what he called the “revolution in microelectronics,” and make use of “less
expensive, small packages of reliable sensors, powerful data processors, and communications.”
This could reduce the inefficiencies and uncertainties that had plagued combat in Vietnam,
including in its huge expenditure of material, needless destruction and indeterminate duration.
Wohlstetter touted the potential of an “expanding family of precision guided munitions” to
permit the “much more effective and discriminating application of force in an increasingly wider
variety of political and operational circumstances.” He enthused about the ability of these new
super-weapons to “transcend notions of war as gratuitous murder,” and to accomplish important
military purposes “and yet contain the destruction.”49
Wohlstetter’s ideas and those of contemporaries like Brzezinski and Andrew Marshall
bear comparison with liberal intellectuals on the eve of World War I who believed that war in the
machine age could serve positive humanitarian and democratic ends; an illusion that soon
thereafter was dispelled.50 They also resembled Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the famed
military strategist who believed poison gases would make war more humane by incapacitating
soldiers rather than allowing them to die an agonizing death from bayonet wounds.51
Vannevar Bush, the president of MIT and director of scientific planning in World War II,
influentially suggested in a 1945 report, Science: The Endless Frontier that science could
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function as the equivalent of the old geographic frontier except that it would never close because
the exploitation of nature was boundless.52 Considering post-war atomic fears to have been
“exaggerated” by “prophets of doom,” Bush enthused during the Korean War about innovations
in air power which resulted in “the ratio of Red casualties going up compared to ours fifty to one
and prompted them to ask for an armistice.” The key lesson was that “if we are really well
armed, the reds will not force a world war on us.”53
Wolfowitz and his other proponents of the RMA drew similar lessons after Vietnam even
with the American defeat. Their emphasis on reducing the destructiveness of war by reliance on
precision-guided weapons was adopted to counter left-wing arguments pertaining to the
necessity of reducing military budgets and scaling back overseas influence. The RMA meshed
with Carter’s human rights policy in its conviction that war could be made more humane. It also
echoed Japanese military doctrines of the 1930s which extolled precision bombs that destroyed
the U.S.S. Arizona in a single strike that went down one of its funnels.54 Over time, prominent
liberal intellectuals came to embrace the RMA which undergirded their championing of
humanitarian intervention.55 The two concepts drew off deep cultural fantasies about the ability
of super-weapons to save humanity, going well with science fiction writing of the era in which
the U.S. annihilated enemies that produced weapons of mass destruction through use of newly
discovered drugs and other inventions and a global Phoenix or assassination program which later
came to realization under the War on Terror.56
The American military escalation in the 1960s had contributed to a dramatic buildup of
Soviet forces, which surpassed the number of American missiles in the early 1970s, prompting
alarmist calls in the defense community to redress the balance.57 Retired General Maxwell
Taylor warned in Foreign Affairs about growing stratification between wealthy countries and the
Third World poor, suggesting that the U.S. may “expect to fight for our national valuables
against envious have-nots.”58 This motive at heart underlay the military-technological revolution
which resulted in the development of famous weapons like the Chrysler M-1 Abrams tank,
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Hughes “Apache” and Sikorsky “Black Hawk” helicopters, Martin laser-guided torpedoes and
artillery shells (“copperheads,”) and General Dynamics F-16 lightweight bomber.59
The Nixon doctrine had provided a blueprint for post-Vietnam strategy in its emphasis on
using surrogate troops and coordinating air and sea operations in support of allied ground forces
or quick surgical assaults by American shock troops lofted abroad by huge jumbo jets and
backed by abundant airpower.60 Many government-owned military plants were privatized in the
1960s and the lure of lucrative contracts encouraged technical innovation in the private sector.
Computers were now integrated into weapon systems with the invention of micro-processors
having allowed for a drastic reduction in computer size. “Smart weapons” were laser-guided or
capable of detecting electronic signals and selecting and attacking a target through mathematical
calculation undertaken by computer chips located inside them. Defense Secretary Harold Brown
(1977-1981), Pentagon Director of Research and Development under McNamara believed that if
smart weapons had been invented earlier “the air campaign against North Vietnam would have
had a different effect.”61 These comments reflect an inability to grasp the socio-historical forces
shaping the outcome of Vietnam and a dominant belief that high-technology could avenge the
“lost war” by ensuring future victories.62
A prodigy who obtained his physics doctorate at the age of twenty-two, Brown had
belonged to the elite group of scientists associated with the Livermore nuclear laboratory at
Berkeley, Cal Tech and the Defense Department and Air Force who possessed an “almost
religious-like devotion to the Cold War arms race,” as historian David Noble put it. These “Whiz
Kids” considered thermonuclear and other high-tech military hardware as “weapons of life”
capable of deterring Soviet aggression and preserving national and international security, fitting
with deeper cultural norms.63
Possessing a tremendous talent for details relating to technical and budget issues, Brown
had championed defoliation and jet fighter innovations during the Vietnam War and biological
warfare testing and pushed for an escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam “without concern
for civilian casualties,” according to the Pentagon Papers. At one point, Brown turned his back
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on two RAND Corporation researchers when they reported the Strategic Hamlet program was
not working, showing his unwillingness to understand what was going on and antipathy towards
contrarian views. A contemporary said Brown was scientifically oriented but rather cold like
McNamara, never showing interest in the lives or feelings of his employees, let alone those
living on the receiving end of the weapons he championed.64 Journalist Roger Morris
characterized Brown as a “reliable organizational man” who displayed “mindless acceptance of
the universe beyond his well-equipped laboratory.”65
Striving to control world sea-lanes and maintain status as a “Pacific Power” after
Vietnam, the Carter administration at Brown’s urging built more than 90 new naval ships at a
rate 70% greater than the Nixon-Ford administrations, and adopted an “offset strategy” designed
to regain strategic advantage over Warsaw Pact forces and other geopolitical rivals through
synergistic application of new technologies.66 Considerable advances were made in subsonic
cruise missiles propelled by Williams’ turbo-fan jet engine and equipped with a radio altimeter
and Terrain Contour matching (TERCOM) guidance system which worked by loading a digital
map into the cruise missile computer that allowed for the avoidance of obstacles. Invested with
the ability to fly close enough to the ground to go undetected, they possessed a warhead that was
ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.67
Seven hundred million dollars was budgeted for development of Remotely Piloted
Vehicles (RPVs) which were valued for their ability to perform “high-risk and politically
sensitive missions more practically and inexpensively than piloted aircraft.”68 Edward Teller, the
hydrogen bomb creator and prototype of Dr. Strangelove, considered RPVs equivalent to “radars
and computers in 1935” in their potential.69 Teledyne Ryan (later Northrop), Lockheed and
Boeing models flight tested at the secret Area 51 military base in Nevada were equipped with TV
cameras and a laser designator for target-spotting as well as 35-pound guided projectiles.
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DARPA also developed a miniaturized drone the size of a horsefly known as the
Insectothopter.70
Major Jack Clifton, coordinator of the army RPV program stated that “we intend to use
these birds as an integral part of our artillery…We’re trying to remove the individual as much as
possible from the battlefield.” This echoed the view of Harold Brown who had championed
drones as Air Force Secretary and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who had enthused over the
bombing of North Vietnam as LBJ’s Deputy Defense Secretary. They and many others
envisioned that war in the post-Vietnam era would become a “contest between machines – which
do not bleed, die, get addicted to drugs, shoot their officers or refuse to fight,” as Robert Barkan,
a former Bell Telephone Laboratories engineer wrote in The New Republic, referencing the
breakdown of the U.S. army in Vietnam. “A pilot flying an RPV bombing run from a swivel
chair in an underground control center doesn’t look out his cockpit window at the death and
destruction below and wonder, ‘Why am I doing this?’ He doesn’t watch the flak coming at him
and swear that he’ll never fly again. He feels no more compunction than the engineer who
designed the machine.”71 The drone was thus the perfect vehicle for perpetuating the American
imperial project in an era when a considerable portion of the public no longer believed in its
tenets or wanted to fight for it.
Drone development contributed in turn to the belief among air power enthusiasts like
John A. Warden III, an architect of U.S. military strategy in the Persian Gulf War that Billy
Mitchell’s vision of an “air only campaign” could succeed under certain circumstances. 72 A 1975
study entitled New Horizons II provided eight long-term steps for the Air Force to maximize
technological progress that included taking full advantage of signal and data processing and
computer technology advances, developing a survivable space system, investing in laser
weapons and the development of all-weather aircraft, improving heavy lift capability and
developing a digitalized, worldwide cartographic memory bank.73
Innovations like electro-optical viewing, low altitude and night targeting infrared and
automated air missile launch systems, and improved warning capability and maneuverability
added to a perception of omnipotence in conjunction with advances in computerized safety
features and flight controls. Pilots could now punch in coordinates of an enemy tank derived
from computer and relay information on a dime to an airborne command post that could call in
air strikes calculated through mathematical algorithms. Laser spot trackers and cameras enabled
not only the pinpointing of camouflaged targets but also provided instantaneous target damage
70
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assessments eliminating the need for follow-up reconnaissance.74 B-52 bombers meanwhile were
modified to carry cruise missiles with computerized guidance systems that could hit targets as far
as 1,500 miles away. New jet fighters were also developed like the Fairchild Republic (later
Northrop-Grumman) A-10 Warthog, a workhorse of the 1st Persian Gulf and Kosovo wars which
could fire 4,200 rounds of 30-millimeter armor-piercing shells a minute and had quick-turn
capability to avoid enemy ground-fire.75
Over two billion dollars were budgeted throughout the 1970s for electronic weapons and
radar planes that could “see” up to 200 miles behind enemy lines along with the Lockheed F-117
“stealth bomber” designed with curves and sharp angles to deflect radar beams. Made from
Fibaloy, a composite developed by Dow Chemical Co, Time Magazine characterized the F-117
as a “death machine out of Darth Vader’s workshop.” Air Force Secretary Edward C. Aldridge
said it would “strengthen the cause of peace.”76 Elusive even for the Hawk missile’s powerful
tracking system, stealth technology was later incorporated into helicopters, cruise missiles and
RPVs.77 Harold Brown was among its greatest enthusiasts. He claimed after leaking news of it
on the eve of the 1980 election that stealth was “of such great military significance” it would
“alter the military balance.”78
In 1979, the Pentagon brought together six prime contractors (Westinghouse, Honeywell,
Hughes, Texas Instruments, IBM and TRW) and many more subcontractors in high-speed
integrated circuits to enhance chip manufacturing for military purposes. The Carter
administration was willing to spend over $30 million over six years to bring military standards to
the state of the art, which DARPA Director George Heilmeier said would make a “magnitude of
difference in U.S. weapons capabilities.”79 The Pentagon also at this time financed creation of a
multi-launch rocket system (MLRS) that could fill the air with small steel fragments (“steel
rain”) and anti-tank missiles equipped with infra-red guidance that could saturate an area the size
of six football fields with 7,200 grenade fragments capable of piercing light armor at a range of
20 miles.80 The CIA’s Office of Technical Services was developing digital imaging and the first
filmless camera, and the Pentagon in 1977 directed the military to exert more research and
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training efforts into chemical warfare. A new generation of interceptor missiles and a nonnuclear kill vehicle was further created as part of a revolution in ballistic missile defense that
made use of new sensor technologies and the development of super-computers by Lockheed that
could make 500 million calculations per second.81
Robert Gates wrote in his memoirs that the “perception of U.S. strategic power and
strength in the first half of the 1980s was in fact Ronald Reagan reaping the harvest sown by
Nixon, Ford and Carter.” Carter “sustained every major strategic modernization program while
beginning at least one important new one [stealth technology].”82 Harold Brown played an
influential role in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II negotiations in helping to
protect the U.S. lead in and future development of nuclear and conventional armed cruise
missiles and in retaining the right for the U.S. to deploy the M-X (missile experimental).83 Carter
had approved production of the M-X against the wishes of dovish Congressmen like Senator
Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and even CIA Director Stansfield Turner. Vice President Walter Mondale
considered the M-X the “most terrible weapon ever devised.” Costing $33.3 billion over ten
years, it had a 300-kiloton yield, 20 times stronger than that of the atomic bomb used to destroy
Hiroshima. Its internal computer used chip technology to guide it within thirty feet of a target
after a journey of thousands of miles.84 The M-X required construction of 4,600 hardened
concrete shelters and thousands of miles of roads between shelters in the valleys of Utah and
Nevada. This made the engineering marvel among the biggest construction projects in the
American history (bigger than the Panama Canal and Alaska pipeline).85
Carter in principle was opposed to an expansion of the nuclear arsenal and appointed as
chief SALT negotiator Paul Warnke, who considered the arms race as the “mindless mimickery
of two apes on a treadmill.”86 Carter nevertheless wound up initiating the biggest nuclear buildup
in two decades and promoted a nuclear tipped advanced radiation warhead for the army’s
LANCE tactical missiles, otherwise known as the “neutron bomb” which could attack fixed or
non-fixed targets. The potential “people killer” could in theory lessen inhibition against the use
of nuclear weapons, though was nixed after protests when a plan to deploy it in Europe was
announced.87
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At the behest of the Senate’s “laser lobby,” Harold Brown directed the military to explore
the use of directed energy weapons (DEWs) such as the particle beam which could destroy its
target by transferring energy to it in the form of a concentrated beam of atomic or subatomic
particles and high energy lasers in space. Their roots could be traced to science fiction writings
like H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds and the Buck Rodgers series in which light beams and
death rays were used to kill people.88
Prior to his death from cancer in 1977, space program creator Werner Von Braun, who
had been recruited under the infamous Operation Paperclip, warned that “space war would be
collective suicide, total ruin even for the one who started it.”89 The Pentagon nevertheless
persisted in advancing space-based satellites designed for photo-mapping and military
communications, along with Navstar, the precursor to Global Positioning System (GPS) in which
satellites circling the earth at an altitude of 11,000 miles sent out signals allowing for users to
determine their positions and velocity in three dimensions anywhere in the world in any
weather.90 The Carter administration gave Vought aerospace firm, later bought by a division of
Lockheed Martin, a $58.7 million contract for developing miniature homing vehicles, or space
based rockets that could strike a target locked by heat-seeking sensors. Brown redirected high
energy laser research to emphasize space-based applications. In a precursor to Reagan’s Star
Wars, DARPA further promoted development of space-based laser battle stations armed with
DEWs designed to defend U.S. satellites or defeat an attack by Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs). Killer satellites were capable of hunting down and destroying enemy satellites
along with alien spacecraft presumably, as a New York Times reporter joked!91
Reflecting the zeitgeist of the times, the Pentagon staged a tri-service show of “smart
weapons” at the White Sands missile range New Mexico in mid-1978 where Congress, the press
and military hierarchy witnessed an F-4 Phantom unload a five-hundred-pound laser guided
bomb that incinerated a fuel target and Navy A-7 attack jet packing a television-guided Walleye
missile destroy a camouflaged structure. From a ridge a half mile from the grandstand, two
soldiers then aimed a laser designator device at a tank seven miles off in the desert and put three
bursts of laser beams on the tank. Six miles to the rear behind a mountain, a computer linked to
the laser designator aimed a 155-milimeter howitzer in the direction of the tank and fired a
copperhead flying shell guided by sensors which destroyed the tank. After the show was over,
Harold Brown and his right hand man for research and development, William J. Perry said they
had staged the demonstration to show the world that despite the mounting criticism of the U.S.
88
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military it “remains strong…We are not second to anyone in military capability [though] as long
as Soviet military expenditures continues to increase at a rate of four to five percent per year, it is
necessary for us to take advantage of the technology of these precision-guided munitions.”92
These comments capture the enthusiasm and confidence in technological advance as a
means of revitalizing U.S. military power after Vietnam. The way Brown saw it, the U.S. had
reached a historical turning point where “we must decide whether we intend to remain the
strongest nation in the world. The alternative is to let ourselves slip into inferiority, into a
position of weakness in a harsh world where principles unsupported by power are victimized,
and to become a nation with more of a past than a future.”93
Brown and Perry were challenged by a clique in the Pentagon headed by John Boyd,
Vice-Commander of the Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai secret air base during the Vietnam War,
who believed that weapon systems had become so expensive and complex to operate that fewer
models were being built and they could not be deployed effectively. In Boyd’s conception
“machines don’t fight wars, people do and they use their minds.” Top heavy military and
Pentagon bureaucracy discouraged innovation.94 Though nobly waging “bureaucratic guerrilla
warfare,” from inside the “big green spending machine” and “Versailles on the Potomac,” the
movement for military reform did not ultimately question the impetus behind the Cold War or
America’s role as a global hegemon. Instead, it aimed to promote a leaner and more efficient
smart-tech fighting machine, championing the F-16 “Fighting Falcon” and A-10 “warthog.
Franklin “Chuck” Spinney, a Boyd protégé, told Time Magazine in 1983 that he was no enemy
of military spending, he just “wanted the nation to get value for its dollar. My view is that our
country has to be strong and that we have to have the military assets to ensure that strength.”95
These comments epitomize the narrowness of political debate at a time when the antiwar left had
been marginalized; a key development underlying the reinvigoration of the permanent warfare
state.96
George F. Kennan, the father of the containment strategy, stated in 1980 that not since
World War II has there been “so far-reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the
capitol. An unsuspecting stranger, plunged into its midst, could only conclude that the last hope
of peaceful nonmilitary solutions has been exhausted – that from now on only weapons, however
used could count.”97 The weapons-building binge coincided with the modernization of the allvolunteer force and efforts to revive the military’s image through better pay incentives and
educational training programs and better inclusion of women and minorities, efforts to curtail the
drug problem and through better public relations. Recruitment was bolstered by a massive
advertising blitz and adoption of the advertising slogan: “Be all that you can be,” developed in
1979 by four-star General Maxwell Thurman, which coincided with programs to provide young
people in an age of rising college tuition with technical skills necessary to operate complex
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automated systems that could translate into lucrative future careers.98 Many military
professionals were motivated by taking technical pride in his/her work at this time, rather than by
the cause for which he/she was fighting in a major transformation.99
To enhance the agility of ground forces, Carter directed Brown to create an elite Special
Force Unit (Delta Force) which was deployed in a botched effort to rescue American hostages
following the Iranian revolution (“Operation Eagle Claw”).100 William J. Perry, the Pentagon’s
director of research and development and engineering, said that if the Special Forces had access
to the army’s new Blackhawk helicopter [instead of older models that crashed or had to be
abandoned] Eagle Claw might “have been a different story.”101 Founder of a defense-electronics
firm which developed digital image processing capabilities for aerial photography, Perry
championed a $5 billion airborne radar system called Assault Breaker that could peer far behind
enemy lines and detect suspicious movement. An on-board computer processed information
before selecting a target to be destroyed by guided missiles. Evolving into the Joint Surveillance
Target Attack System (JSTARS) used in Gulf War I, the Breaker had the capacity to destroy
“Soviet military divisions to prevent their exploiting a breakthrough of NATO defenses without
the resort to nuclear weapons.” “Perry’s wet dream,” however could not actually tell the
difference between armored vehicles and ‘lower value targets’ (trucks or automobiles) according
to a Government Accounting Office probe, and was not designed to do so, making it a waste of
taxpayer dollars.102
Mesmerized by high-technology, Perry and other proponents of the RMA did not
generally consider the human consequences of the weapons they championed or how political
circumstances might impact military outcomes. A main fixation of these “one-dimensional” men
was with developing greater capacity to see and track events at greater distances to set-up attacks
with long range precision weapons, ground sensors considered extremely effective in the
electronic battlefield and drones. Gen. William Depuy predicted in 1974 that in the future “what
can be seen can be hit, what can be hit, can be killed.”103 The catastrophe of Vietnam would thus
never be repeated. The danger of Carter’s arms build-up was reflected, however, in the
comments of a senior military officer who presented the 1986 bombing of Libya as an
“opportunity to show how well the money is being spent on aircraft and weapons,”104 suggesting
like Walt W. Rostow before, that once the latter had been developed, they would have to be
made operational somewhere.105
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Washington was keen generally to co-opt the human rights consciousness of the 1970s to
its own interest, using human rights as a mechanism for restoring public faith in American
benevolence and supporting a more “activist foreign policy” and “surge in high-tech armaments
reminiscent of the early days of John F. Kennedy,” Noam Chomsky wrote.106 This goal was
achieved primarily by using a human rights discourse to condemn communist and revolutionary
governments and insurgent movements opposed by the United States, alongside the adoption of
the new technologies which could in theory render war politically costless and humane.107
The Carter administration followed through on some aspects of its human rights rhetoric
such as slashing the CIAs budget and cutting arms sales, however, as we have seen had no
compunction about efforts to make American weapons more technologically advanced. Seventy
five percent of security assistance still went to countries notorious for human rights violations,
including Saudi Arabia which was sold M-60 tanks and laser guided bombs as private companies
staffed by ex-Green Berets like the Vinnell Corporation trained its National Guard.108 The Carter
administration provided the Iranian Shah at least $12 billion worth of high-tech weaponry, sold
Egypt RPVs, and equipped Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Suharto of Indonesia, the
Moroccan King, Omani Sultan, Thai security forces who massacred student demonstrators and
Pol Pot’s Kampuchean resistance forces after they had been expelled by Vietnam (Zbigniew
Brzezinski considered the Vietnamese “illegal occupiers”). Carter also sent emergency assistance
to Congolese paratroopers under Joseph Mobutu as they crushed leftist guerrillas in the diamondrich Shaba Province, which produced cobalt and tantalum used in the manufacture of smart
weapons and RPVs.109
In March 1980, San Salvador Archbishop Oscar Romero sent a letter to Carter pleading
with his administration to stop sending military equipment and advisers, which had the effect of
making more acute the ‘injustices and repression against those groups who have often strived to
obtain respect for their most fundamental rights.” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance responded by
claiming that the “revolutionary junta” was “moderate and reformist” and that military aid was
helping professionalize the armed forces and the government “to defend and carry forward its
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program of reform.”110 Less than a month later, Romero would be killed with the complicity of
the “reformist” military officers equipped by the “human rights” president as El Salvador
descended into civil war.
As the Matanza in El Salvador was unfolding, the Carter administration oversaw one of
the greatest base construction efforts in history and created a rapid mobility force to the Middle
East to stand guard over petroleum supplies as part of the “Carter doctrine,” a change away from
dependence on the Shah and Saudis as regional Gendarmes. Considering Islam to be compatible
with the Christian West, Brzezinski laid out a vision of an Islamic Tier running through Southern
Asia, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf backed by hard U.S. military power, and spearheaded
funding to anti-Soviet mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan through General Zia in Pakistan in order
to precipitate a Soviet invasion designed to give them their Vietnam.111 Carter’s policies overall
contributed to ample human rights abuses. His military build-up should be considered in wider
context as part of the reinvigoration of the U.S. empire in the post-Vietnam era and as an
important prelude to the rise of neo-conservatism.
According to popular mythology, the fruits of Carter and Reagan’s arms buildup and the
RMA were realized during the 1st Persian Gulf War when high-tech weapons systems drove
Saddam Hussein’s armies from Kuwait and only one hundred American soldiers were killed,
mostly from friendly fire. During 1991 Congressional hearings on the performance of high
technology, chairman Les Aspin (D-WI) stated that there “had been a revolution in high
technology weaponry underway for years,” and that its fruits had been “evident on the battlefield
“symbolized by precision munitions entering buildings exactly through windows and
garages.”112 The RAND Corporation ranked laser and precision guided missiles used in the war
with the introduction of “firearms, the phalanx, and the chariot as a defining moment in human
history.”113 The post-war triumphalism obscured, however, that a hundred thousand Iraqis were
killed, equivalent to the number in eight years of the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam remained in power
and the country’s infrastructure was predominantly destroyed, creating a humanitarian
catastrophe when economic sanctions were applied and backlash against the United States.114
Many of the wars’ signature weapons furthermore such as Patriot and Tomahawk
Missiles and F-117 Stealth fighter did not perform well. Laser Guided Bombs had a success rate
of under 1.5 percent in destroying bridges as 70 percent of bombs missed their targets. Twentytwo thousand civilians were killed in Baghdad alone, with tomahawk missiles striking apartment
buildings, a swimming pool and non-military targets because of mis-navigation by their guidance
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system.115 Space-based satellite and drone surveillance and Joint Surveillance Target and Attack
Radar System (JSTARS), which could see some 19,305 square miles of terrain below in darkness
and bad weather, created data overload and did not prevent intelligence failures like miscounting
enemy troops in Kuwait. They also failed to locate mobile scud launchers in the Western Iraqi
desert despite their being the highest-priority target of the war.116
Carter at times during his presidency had outlined a liberal alternative vision and even
urged rethinking the culture of consumption driving an imperialistic foreign policy. However, he
continued to arm oppressive governments, escalated the military’s presence in the Middle East
and advanced the RMA. His administration’s military build-up coincided with attempts to
channel the human rights activism of the 1960s into a reinvigorated movement for an activist
foreign policy on the Kennedy-Johnson model directed against communist regimes, which
violated human rights. Drawing on deep-rooted cultural fantasies about the transformative effect
of technology and ability of super-weapons to vanquish evil, the RMA provided an ingenious
means of sustaining America’s global empire at a limited political cost. Defining an era in which
machines were reducing human manpower and solidarity, it built on Vietnam’s electronic
battlefield in prioritizing surveillance technologies and computer-driven targeting and precision
strikes which made war seem like a pinball video game.
Fred Branfman’s 1972 book, Voices From the Plain of Jars: Life Under an Air War, had
chronicled the emotional detachment of American pilots and other military personnel engaged in
this form of warfare in Laos, a sideshow of the Vietnam War.117 Branfman infiltrated the top
secret Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai base which housed giant super-computers in a heavily
fortified underground bunker that received signals from electronic sensor and radar devices and
were used to select the targets for bombing. The atmosphere inside, he said, resembled a stockmarket exchange, where career-oriented officers ordered attacks on Laotian rice farmers without
much second thought.118 “If the Nazi activities represented a kind of apex to an age of
inhumanity, American atrocities in Laos are clearly of a different order,” Branfman wrote. “Not
so much inhuman as a-human. The people of Na Nga and Nong Sa were not the object of
anyone’s passion. They simply weren’t considered. What is most striking about American
bombing in Laos is the lack of animosity felt by the killers to their victims. Most of the
Americans involved have little if any knowledge of Laos or its people. Those who do rather like
them.”119 Jimmy Carter’s presidency should be remembered for helping to institutionalize the
kind of warfare described by Branfman in which soldiers functioned as technicians, removed
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from the scene of battle. It in turn helped facilitate a perception of American omnipotence and
made waging war too easy, leading ultimately to disastrous overreach.

